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ABSTRACT 
The author identifies an important trend in deliberation of international standards of good practice 
in protection of refugees based on ad hoc networking and cooperation between judges and other 
experts under the auspices of the IARLJ. Since the legal questions in status determination 
procedures under EU law very often fall under the competence of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU), the author suggests that stakeholders in those projects must respect the constitutional 
structure of the EU by considering what kind of approach towards the standards of due process can 
be expected to be introduced by the CJEU. This is also relevant for the ongoing project of the 
IARLJ on the use of country-of-origin information and due process. While the minimum standards 
clauses under EU secondary law give a clear direction to the IARLJ's checklist as to where to build 
on a value added, it remains highly unclear what is the interpretative relevance of the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter) and the right to effective judicial protection. The 
author's short analysis of the recent case-law of the CJEU identifies two major, though different, 
approaches towards legal interpretation of the EU law based on the Charter. A combination of both 
– top-down  and bottom-up - approaches puts the Charter into a specific perspective, where one 
cannot be expected to act under the legal circumstances of having EU constitutional law as a 
starting point, with the Charter being always placed at the top of legal argumentation. This will very 
probably also affect the “duty of cooperation” laid down in the Article 4(1) of the Qualifications 
Directive in relation to the use of country-of-origin information. In the conclusion, the author 
suggests that with its checklist on “best international practice”, the IARLJ might considerably 
improve legal uncertainties and minimum standards based on EU (fundamental) law. 
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The International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ) has so far issued two checklists or 
guidelines for improving the rule of law in the field of international refugee law: these are the 
‘Judicial Criteria for Assessing Country of Origin Information (COI): A Checklist’ (October 2006) 
and the ‘Guidelines on the Judicial Approach to Expert Medical Evidence’ (June 2010). In 2012, in 
collaboration with the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the UNHCR, the IARLJ is participating 
in a project to define the criteria for assessing the credibility of applicants for international 
protection; this project is expected to be completed at the end of 2012. The London roundtable of 
the Procedures Working Party and Country of Origin Information Working Party of the IARLJ is the 
next example of this new type of deliberation of (legal) standards of good practice based on 
horizontal ad hoc cooperation and networking between national judges of different Member States, 
academics, lawyers, experts, non-governmental organisations, specialised agencies of the EU, like 
European Asylum Support Office, the UNHCR and decision makers in the field of refugee 
protection. 
THE IARLJ CHECKLIST AS A SET OF STANDARDS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE 
MINIMUM STANDARDS UNDER EU LAW 
Both terms contained in the title of the London roundtable are legal notions under EU law. The 
problem is that EU directives do not regulate procedural standards for the use of COI in 
administrative and judicial procedures. However, under the Lisbon Treaty, the general principle of a 
right to an effective legal remedy is explicitly regulated in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (the Charter)
1
 as primary law. There is also Art. 39 of the Procedures Directive 
(PD)
2
, which is secondary law and which introduces effective legal remedy in the relevant specific 
field of refugee law. This means that any lacunae in law and any open questions regarding the 
interpretation of due process in relation to COI fall under the constitutional competence of the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This is important from the standpoint of the democratic structure of 
the EU and the institutional balance between the CJEU, the EU legislator and national judiciaries, 
where members of the IARLJ are acting judges of national courts. In other words, with the 
forthcoming checklist, which aims to set good procedural standards for the use of COI, the IARLJ 
will in some sense step into the shoes of the CJEU. Therefore, in discussing or preparing a checklist 
or set of guidelines for the fair and effective use of COI, the stakeholders in this project should 
carefully consider what kind of approach towards the standards of due process can be expected to 
be introduced into our legal systems by the CJEU based on the preliminary rulings. Rather than 
opposing it, the IARLJ checklist should complement the standards ensuing from CJEU case-law. 
Thus, the IARLJ checklist will not oppose the EU (constitutional) law and legal interpretations of 
the CJEU. Such informal and indirect judicial dialogue between the IARLJ and CJEU could be 
beneficial for the development of the rule of law.  
Legally speaking, the IARLJ checklist is able to complement the standards ensuing from CJEU 
case-law because the existing directives and the forthcoming Recast Procedures Directive regulate 
(and will regulate) only minimum standards.
3
 However, the relevant question is what those 
                                               
1Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (O J C, 83/02, 30. 3. 2010). 
2Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status (O J L, 326/13, 13. 12. 2005). 
3Article 5 of the PD; Art. 3 of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
RLI WORKING PAPER No. 6  
minimum standards will be in practice, and what kind of role the Charter as a fundamental 
(primary) law is expected to play in the legal interpretation of those standards. 
LEGAL RELEVANCE OF THE CHARTER  
From the CJEU judgment in the case of Brahim Samba Diouf from July 2011,
4
 which dealt with 
accelerated procedures, two important conclusions can be drawn.  
First, Art. 47 of the Charter might not play a very significant role in the use of COI; this is because, 
in this judgment, the CJEU only mentions the Charter in the introductory part of the judgment,
5
 
while the CJEU’s main argument is built on the text of Art. 39 of the PD and on the purpose of the 
PD. In relation to effective legal remedy, the CJEU even uses the term ‘general principle’ and not 
the term ‘right’. One cannot therefore be expected to act under the legal circumstances of having 
EU (“constitutional”) law as a starting point, with the Charter being placed on the top of legal 
interpretation and argumentation. On the basis of the Diouf judgment, it is quite obvious that 
secondary law could be more important than primary law. Within the framework of the hierarchy of 
EU legal sources, we can reasonably expect a bottom-up and not a top-down approach to the legal 
interpretation of due process and the use of COI. EU secondary legislation will be of paramount 
importance; it will give specific expressions to the provisions of the Charter and not vice versa.
6
 A 
similar approach to legal interpretation was adopted by the CJEU in case(s) not dealing with 
asylum, where the CJEU states that “the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is 
proclaimed in Art. 21 of the Charter and given specific expression in the Directive 2000/78” /.../.7 In 
the case of El Dridi,
8
  which relates to the detention of a third-country national staying illegally in a 
Member State and refusing to obey an order to leave, the CJEU based the standard of 
proportionality on the recital 13 of the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals,
9
 while the Charter was not mentioned at all.  
If secondary law will give specific expressions to the provisions of the Charter and not vice versa, 
judges will have much less room in which to produce legal interpretations of the EU law. 
Second, in the Diouf judgment the CJEU states that effective standards of judicial protection are 





                                                                                                                                                            
international protection and the content of the protection granted (hereinafter: QD), O J L 304/12, 30. 9. 2004); Article 5 
of the amended proposal for a directive /.../ on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection status (Recast) Brussels, 1. 6. 2011, COM(2011) 319 final, 2009/0165 (COD) – hereinafter: the Recast 
Procedures Directive. 
4C-69/10, 18 July 2011. 
5Ibid. para. 3 
6See judgment in the Diouf case, C-69/10, paras. 28., 33–35, 48–49, 54, 60–61.   
7Judgment of the CJEU, C-297/10 and C-298/10, para. 78. 
8Judgment of the CJEU, C-61/11 PPU, 28. 4. 2011, para. 57. 
9O J L 348, 24. 12. 2008. 
10Judgment of the CJEU, Diouf, C-69/10, para. 69 
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“A DUTY OF COOPERATION” 
The judgment in the case of M., which is now pending before the CJEU, will be even more 
important for the judicial checklist, since its preliminary question relates to the scope of the duty of 
cooperation between the applicant and decision-maker in relation to the use of COI. Advocate-
General Bot has already issued his opinion in this case.
11
 It is a very interesting opinion and one that 
is relevant to determining the checklist on COI and due process, although he did clearly follow the 
approach of the CJEU in the Diouf Case in respect of the legal relevance of the Charter. 
In the case of M., the referring Irish court asks the CJEU whether the duty of cooperation laid down 
in Art. 4(1) of the QD requires the administrative authority to communicate to the applicant the 
elements on which it intends to base its decision and to seek the applicant’s observations in that 
regard before adopting a negative decision. In this case, the Irish authorities rejected the application 
due to serious doubts regarding credibility, relying on a COI from Rwanda which Mr M. was not 
made aware of during the procedure. At the hearing before the CJEU, a legal representative of the 
applicant requested that the CJEU reformulate the question so as to allow it, in essence, to consider 
whether the examination procedure ensured provision of the right to an effective judicial remedy as 
embodied in Art. 47 of the Charter. The Advocate-General proposes that the CJEU should not grant 
this request for reformulation of the question.
12 
To an extent, his reluctance to use Art. 47 of the 
Charter is understandable, since Art. 4(1) QD refers to the assessment of facts submitted by the 
applicant for international protection. However, the provision of Art. 4(1) of the QD does not refer 
to communication between the administrative or determining authority and the applicant; instead, it 
refers to communication between the Member State and the applicant. In any case, the Advocate-
General at that stage of argumentation does not place the issue of referral under Art. 47 of the 
Charter or Art. 39 of the PD, but regards it as the right to be heard and the general principle of good 
administration. His chief method of interpretation of the referral issue is as follows: 
He examines the concrete expression given to the right to be heard by EU secondary legislation in 
the PD and QD. Although it is very clear that Art. 4 of the QD is of procedural nature, he states that 
the content and purpose of the QD do not seek to set out the procedural rules or to lay down the 
procedural safeguards that the applicant must be afforded. The sole objective of the QD is to set the 
criteria that must be met in order to qualify for international protection. In his opinion, the PD sets 
and specifies what is entailed by the term ‘cooperation’ in Art. 4(1) of the QD.13 Bot’s main 
argument is that since the provision on the first meeting under Art. 12(2(b) of the PD and the 
provision on the personal interview under Art. 12(1) of the PD do not regulate the right to 
communicate the relevant elements to the applicant before the decision is taken, the applicant does 
not have the right to be heard in the sense that this issue was referred to by the referring court. 
Furthermore, in his opinion, this right in asylum matters cannot be derived from CJEU case-law 
from other fields of legal dispute under EU law.
14
 
The important consequence of this opinion, should the CJEU accept it, is that national courts, as the 
                                               
11Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 26 April 2012, C-277/11, M. v Ministry for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform. 
12Ibid. para. 10. 
13Ibid. paras. 18–19, 22. This is confirmed by the Recast Qualification Directive (O J, L 33779, 20. 12. 2011, recital 16), 
which explicitly states that the Recast Qualification Directive promotes the application of certain articles from the 
Charter, but Art. 47. of the Charter is not mentioned among them. The Recast Procedures Directive will promote the 
right from Art. 47. of the Charter (see Recast Procedures Directive, recital 47). 
14Ibid. paras. 68, 73, 75. 
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second independent instance, will have to give an applicant the chance to comment on the COI 
when it was not presented to the applicant in the administrative procedure, since Advocate-General 
Bot at that point refers to Art. 39 PD and the thorough review of the national court.
15  
This is in line with the amended proposal for the recast PD, which in a new article on effective legal 
remedy states that effective remedy provides for a full examination of both facts and points of law, 




What I see as being very positive in this opinion is that it stresses at several points that Member 
States are free to strengthen the fundamental safeguards afforded to the applicant in the examination 
of his application.
17
 This therefore provides a legitimate space for the IARLJ checklist to propose 
higher standards. The checklist must retain this difference in terminology and substance: while the 
CJEU will set an authoritative interpretation of positive law based on minimum or basic standards, 
the IARLJ checklist could advocate ‘best standards in international practice’. This would constitute 
a useful indirect dialogue between the CJEU and IARLJ.  
Furthermore, the Advocate-General Bot adds that he shall interpret the provision with regard, in 




He states that the right to be heard is linked to a fair trial under Art. 47 of the Charter;
19
 in his 
opinion, the right to be heard is a general principle of EU law applicable even when the legislation 
does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement.
20
 Adherence to this procedural right 
in asylum procedures is of cardinal importance, and any infringement of that right must be censured 
as such by the court and entail annulment of the national authorities’ decision or the part of the 
national authorities’ decision concerning the facts or objections on which the person concerned has 
been unable to make representations.
21  
I believe his opinion to be very reasonable when it states that any failure to confront an applicant 
with a particular COI before a negative decision is taken is not an absolute error in procedural law 




The Advocate-General makes no reference whatsoever to ECtHR case-law in Art. 13 in conjunction 
with Art. 3 of the ECHR, but I do not think his opinion contradicts ECtHR case-law as long as 
national courts take that responsibility and confront an applicant with the important COI and give 
                                               
15Ibid. para. 84. 
16From the standpoint of the case law of the ECtHR, even the national court of final instance must, if circumstances 
change, provide a full ex nunc assessment of the case (Salah Sheekh, para. 136; N.A. v. the UK, para. 112).  
17Opinion of Advocate General Bot, C-277/11, paras. 85, 92, second paragraph of the conclusion. 
18Ibid. para. 29 
19Ibid. para. 31 
20Ibid. 32. This is an important adjustment to the position that secondary law will give specific expressions to the 
provisions of the Charter (and not vice versa). 
21Ibid. 41. 
22Ibid. paras. 107–111. 
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him/her a chance to respond in judicial procedure. The ECtHR states that it is ‘frequently necessary 
to give the applicants the benefit of doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility. However, 
when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum 
seeker’s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged 
discrepancies’.23 For realisation of this standard, it is necessary for the applicant to be confronted 
with that COI before a negative decision on credibility is taken. 
LEGAL RELEVANCE OF THE CHARTER IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CASE-LAW 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
In comparison to the previously described legal interpretation of effective judicial protection, 
formally a different approach to legal interpretation and the role of the Charter was adopted by 
Advocate-General Verica Trstenjak in her opinion in the case of N.S. from 22 September 2011
24
. 
Here, the Charter (Art. 47 in general terms) as the fundamental law is put on the top of the legal 
interpretation. In her opinion, Dublin Regulation no. 343/2003
25
, which allows a certain measure of 
discretion, in Art. 3(2), to Member States, must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with fundamental rights; Member States must ensure that they do not rely on 
interpretation of an instrument of secondary legislation that would be in conflict with fundamental 
rights.
26
 The CJEU has followed the approach of Advocate-General Trstenjak.  However, in the 
same manner as the Advocate General, the CJEU in the context of the preliminary question on the 
right to effective remedy and fair trial does not refer specifically to the Art 47(1) or to the Art. 47(2) 
of the Charter, but it merely refers to "fundamental rights protected by the European legal order" 
and to "general principles of European Union law".
27
  
Furthermore, one needs to bear in mind that the CJEU, in the same judgment, acknowledged that, 
according to the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of M.S.S.
28, ‘the Member State would infringe 
Article 4 of the Charter if it transferred an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within 
the meaning of Regulation no. 343/2003 in the circumstances described in paragraph 94 of the 
present judgment.’29  
What is highly relevant for the judicial checklist on COI and due process is the method of 
interpretation adopted by the Advocate-General Trstenjak concerning the right to effective legal 
remedy within the meaning of Art. 47 of the Charter. She says that the ‘specific procedural form of 
the effective remedy /.../ is largely left to the Member States. However, this margin of discretion /.../ 
is limited by the requirement that the effectiveness of the remedy must always be guaranteed /.../’; 
                                               
23N. v. Sweden, 20 July 2010, para. 53, Akasiebie v. Sweden, 8 March 2007; S.S. v. UK, 24 January 2012, para. 69 
24 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 22 September 2011, Case C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department. 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by the third-
country national, O J L 50, 25. 2. 2003. 
26Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C-411/10, paras. 118–119, 154. 
27Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) in the case of N.S. from 21 December 2011, para. 77. 
28 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) in case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece from 
21 January 2011. 
29Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) in the case of N.S. from 21 December 2011, para. 113. 
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she also refers to the principle of proportionality from Art. 52(1) of the Charter.
30
 She adds that ‘the 
minimum content of the right to an effective remedy includes the requirements that the remedy to be 
granted to the beneficiary must satisfy the principle of effectiveness /.../. According to that principle, 
the realisation of the rights conferred by EU law may not be rendered practically impossible or 
excessively difficult’.31 What does this mean in the light of the firm text of the Art. 47(1) on the right 
to an effective remedy "in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article" and in the light 
of the Art. 47(2) which incorporate a fair and public hearing, remains entirely an open issue. It also 
provokes an additional problem, since the standard of "practically impossible or excessively 
difficult" realisation of the rights conferred by EU law is not comparable to the "close scrutiny" test 
of the ECtHR, which says that "in order to be effective, the remedy required by Article 13 must be 
available in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be 
unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the Respondent State" and that 
domestic remedy "must deal with the substance of an arguable claim".
32
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE BETTER LEGAL CERTAINTY 
Before the Charter formally came into force on 1 December 2009, the CJEU often used the 
argument that fundamental rights, either with reference to the European Convention on Human 
Rights or to the constitutional traditions common to Member States, were an integral part of the 
general principles of law; however, it seems that the Charter has not strengthened the fundamental 
(nor constitutional) law of the EU as much as one might reasonably have expected given its 
undisputed formal legal value.
33
 It is highly likely that the CJEU, in its future case-law, will 
sometimes regard a particular human right as only ‘proclaimed’ or ‘recognized’ in the Charter, while 
the specific expression to that right will be given by the CJEU on the basis of an interpretation of 
secondary law provisions. One can expect in some cases that the Charter will not be even 
mentioned, despite the fact that human rights from the Charter will be at stake.
34 
In some cases 
perhaps, where secondary law leaves Member States with a margin of discretion, national 
authorities and courts will have to apply secondary law rules in a manner consistent with the 
requirements ensuing from the protection of fundamental rights.
35
 In cases where the ECtHR has 
already issued a relevant judgment on the infringements of human rights under the ECHR, the 
CJEU will certainly use the argument of fundamental law in regard of the relevance of the Charter.  
Furthermore, it will be hard to ignore, in future case-law on asylum the fact that asylum is a 
fundamental right under Art. 18 of the Charter, which means that it is not just the right or the 
principle of an effective legal remedy under Art. 47(1) of the Charter that is at stake but also the 
fundamental right to a ‘fair and public hearing’ under Art. 47(2) of the Charter.  The right under that 
Article is not limited to civil rights as is the case under the case-law of the ECtHR in relation to Art. 
6 of the ECHR in immigration, expulsion and deportation matters.  
                                               
30 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C-411/10, para. 160. 
31Ibid.  paras. 160–161. 
32 Judgment of the ECtHR in case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 january 2011, paras. 288, 290, 293. 
33See Art. 6(1) of the TFEU; the CJEU confirms the Charter has the same legal status as the Treaties in judgment C-
297/10 and C-298/10, para. 47. 
34See e.g. Achughbabian, C-329/11 from 6 December 2011 and El Dridi, C-61/11 PPU, which dealt with  the detention 
of third-country nationals illegally residing in a Member State. 
35See e.g. the judgment of the CJEU in Case 5/88, Wachauf, para. 22 and C-540/03 from 27 June 2006, para. 104. 
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Under such uncertain legal circumstances, clear and firm guidelines or the IARLJ checklist on best 
international practice concerning procedural standards for the use of COI would contribute 
substantially to improving the rule of law and to promote a meaningful judicial dialogue in the field 





                                               
36In the Proposal for the Recast Procedures Directive, there is no general obligation on the part of the determining 
authority to show the COI before a negative decision is taken, but the applicant and his legal adviser may not be denied 
access to the COI, where the determining authority takes that COI into consideration for the purpose of taking a 
decision (Art. 12(1)(d)). However, Art. 16 could set a better standard by saying that an opportunity to present elements 
needed to substantiate the application in accordance with Art. 4 of the QD includes the opportunity to give an 
explanation regarding elements which may be missing and/or any inconsistencies or contradictions in the applicant’s 
statements. Since contradictions may relate to general or specific COI, this means that the determining authority should 
present decisive relevant facts from the COI to the applicant before any negative decision is taken. 
